1/23/2020 - Victor Davis Hanson Townhall.com
Whether
by accident or by deliberate osmosis, Israel and the U.S. have adopted similar
solutions to their existential problems.
Before
2002, during the various Palestinian intifadas, Israel suffered hundreds of
deaths and thousands of injuries from suicide bombers freely crossing from the
West Bank and Gaza into Israel.
In
response, Israel planned a vast border barrier. The international community was
outraged. The Israeli left called the idea nothing short of
"apartheid."
However,
after the completion of the 440-mile border barrier -- part concrete well, part
wire fencing -- suicide bombings and terrorist incursions into Israel declined
to almost nil.
The
wall was not entirely responsible for enhanced Israeli security. But it freed
up border manpower to patrol more vigorously. The barrier also was integrated
with electronic surveillance and tougher laws against illegal immigration.
The
wall also brought strategic and political clarity. Those who damned Israel but
freely crossed its borders sounded incoherent when they became furious that the
barrier prevented access to the hated Zionist entity.
The
Trump administration is currently seeking funds to create new border walls and
replace old, porous fencing in order to stem illegal immigration on the
southern border.
The
strategy seems similar: The wall will free up manpower for better border
policing. It likewise provides a certain political clarity. The United States
is often criticized by Mexico and other Latin American countries. It is now
being taken to task for the effort to make it more difficult to illegally enter
such a supposedly unwelcome and hostile landscape.
For
years, Israel's great weakness was its dependence on imported energy, while its
neighboring enemies grew rich exporting oil and natural gas. Yet in the last
decade, Israel has ramped up production to take advantage of its vast natural
gas reserves -- to the point that it is not just self-sufficient in fossil
fuels but soon will become a major exporter.
Now,
Israel cannot be threatened economically by either Iran or various Persian Gulf
monarchies. Its economy is stronger than ever. Europeans suddenly are more
accommodating, given that Israel may well become a natural gas exporter to a
fuel-hungry Europe.
Like
Israel, but unlike Europe, the U.S. was eager to frack and horizontally drill
to tap vast new fossil fuel reserves. The change in U.S. strategic energy
independence is similarly astounding.
America
is now the largest producer of natural gas and oil in the world. Its output has
increased world supply, dropped prices and hurt America's oil-exporting
enemies.
The
relative power of Russia and Middle Eastern nations, such as Iran, over U.S.
decision-making has radically diminished -- along with the need to station huge
numbers of American troops in the volatile Middle East.
As
in Israel, opponents either argued that more drilling would ruin the
environment or that it would not work. They seem to be wrong on both counts.
Israel's
foreign policy could be called Jacksonian. Israel allies with friends, neutrals
and former enemies whenever they share particular strategic goals.
In
the topsy-turvy Middle East, Israel is now sometimes a strategic partner with
formerly hostile regimes in Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf
monarchies. They all share greater fears of theocratic Iran and its terrorist
appendages in Lebanon, Syria and Yemen.
Apparently,
much of the Arab world is no longer as interested in the Palestinian desire to
destroy Israel. Many Palestinian groups are allied with a despised Iran, while
many Arabs believe that Israel's strength can sometimes be strategically
useful.
Current
American realism is similar. The U.S. is neither isolationist nor an
interventionist nation-builder. Its foreign-policy goals are to enhance its
military, expand its already powerful economy, limit its strategic exposure,
and bank its resulting hard and soft power to use only as a deterrent force
against those who kill Americans or endanger U.S. interests.
Instead
of cajoling allies to join us in expeditionary wars abroad, the U.S.
increasingly appears reluctant to intervene, especially in the Middle East. As
a result, former critics are now becoming suppliants requesting U.S.
assistance.
As
with Israel, the U.S. is less eager to apply political litmus tests to its
occasional allies. It also seeks to avoid quagmires where its overwhelming
conventional firepower can be neutralized by terrorists and urban guerrillas.
The
promoters of these unconventional policies, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin
Netanyahu and U.S. President Donald Trump, are both despised by their
respective establishments and under constant threat of removal by their livid
political opponents.
Yet
they both have transformed their respective countries. Their policies remind us
that it is sometimes preferable to be respected rather than just be liked --
and that when a nation is strong and does not beg for help, it often finds more
than it needs.
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